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COMMENT
The "Kuril Islands" or the "Northern Territories":
Who Owns Them? Island Territorial Dispute
Continues to Hinder Relations Between
Russia and Japan
I.

Introduction

Since the final days of World War II, Japan and what was formerly the Soviet Union have remained caught in a territorial dispute
that has disrupted bilateral relations and continued to block the signing of a formal peace treaty between them.' The territorial dispute
concerns four islands off the northeast coast of Japan: Shikotan,
Kunashiri, Etorofu (or Iturup) and the Habomai group. 2 The former
Soviet Union occupied the islands at the end of World War II, 3 and
since that time Tokyo has argued vehemently for their return to Japanese sovereignty. The dispute, inherited by Russian President Boris Yeltsin after the break-up of the Soviet Union, 4 played a major
role in the cancellation of Yeltsin's visit to Japan in September 19925
and blocks "full-scale economic aid" by Japan to Russia and the
other republics of the former Soviet Union. 6 These countries desperately need the aid during their difficult transition to independence and a free economy.
As is the case in most territorial disputes, the arguments of each
side encompass not only legal claims, but also historical, geographical, strategic, and economic assertions. 7 The Japanese primarily arI BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 339 (Alan DayJay, ed., 2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter BORDER].
2 BORDER, supra note 1, at 339; see infra Part II.A.
3

Id.

4 The Sakhalin region of Russia includes the islands at issue. Michael Richardson,
View From Sakhalin: Kuril Islands Should Remain Russian, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 31, 1992,

available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
5 Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty Could Open Door to Visit, Yeltsin Says, AGENCE FRANCE

PRESSE, Oct. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
6 Russian Official Defends Yeltsin Decree on Kuril Chain,JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, Dec.
12, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. However, Japan has given some

financial aid to the former Soviet Union. U.S. andJapan Will Aid CIS Move Toward Capitalism,
Cable News Network, Inc., Oct. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
7 J.R.V. PRESCOTr, BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS 103 (1978).
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gue that the four disputed islands are historically Japanese because
former Russian influence never spread as far south as these islands
before 1945.8 Japan's interest in the four disputed islands is "a matter of legitimacy and heritage." 9 The territory is considered part of
"ancestral" Japanese land, and correct boundaries "mark off that
which is Japanese from that which is non-Japanese ....

,"lO Moscow

disagrees with Japan's version of the discovery and history of the
area and maintains that certain agreements made among the Allied
powers near the end of World War II give Russia sovereignty over
the four disputed islands."I The former Soviet Union valued the islands for their strategic military significance as a pathway to the Pacific Ocean,' 2 and although the military importance of the disputed
islands is presumably less since the break-up of the former Soviet
Union, Russia still maintains defensive as well as economic and nationalistic interests in the islands.
This Comment begins by sketching the background events in
this territorial dispute. The subsequent sections outline first the Japanese view and then the Russian perspective. Part IV attempts to
determine who has sovereignty over the disputed islands based
purely on the application of traditional international legal principles.
The analysis identifies the traditional legal methods of acquiring territory' 3 and applicable treaty laws and applies them to this sovereignty dispute. The discussion illustrates how an analysis based
solely on such legal definitions is unsatisfactory because so many issues are subject to differing interpretations, and therefore, the conclusion is uncertain and subjective. Part V sketches various ideas
offered by members of the international community to resolve this
territorial dispute. Finally, the author proposes a compromise solution grounded in the recent history of the dispute and based on
legal, political, economic, and environmental considerations.
II. Background
A.

Geography and Ecology of the Islands14

The four islands in dispute are Shikotan, Kunashiri, Etorofu,
and the Habomai group. TheJapanese describe the disputed islands
as the Northern Territories.' 5 The four islands sit off the northeast
coast of Hokkaido, the most northern of Japan's main islands, and
8 BORDER, supra note 1, at 340.
9 FRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL ET AL., PEACE AND DISPUTED SOVEREIGNTY: REFLECTIONS
ON CONFLICT OVER TERRITORY

10 Id. at 69-70.

69 (1985).

I I BORDER, supra note 1, at 340.
12 Id.

13 See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
14 See map p. 661.
15 BORDER, supra note I, at 341.
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two of them, Kunashiri and Etorofu, are the southern most islands in
a chain of twenty islands stretching north to the Russian Kamchatka
Peninsula. 16 The Russians call this chain of islands the Kuril (or
Kurile) Islands.' 7 In terms of land area, listing from largest to smallest, Etorofu covers 3,139 square kilometers, Kunashiri covers 1,500
square kilometers, Shikotan covers 225 square kilometers, and the
Habomai group covers 102 square kilometers.' 8 The Habomais are
the closest to Japan, about five kilometers from the northeast end of
Hokkaido.1 9 Although not one of the four islands in dispute, Sakhalin, a large island lying to the north of the Kurils also plays a role in
the history of the territorial issue by figuring in several important
treaties. 20 Russia currently maintains uncontested sovereignty over
Sakhalin and the Kuril islands north of Kunashiri and Etorofu extending up to the Kamchatka Peninsula.
According to Tokyo, the ecology of the four disputed islands is
similar to that of Japan's main islands. 2 1 Tokyo points to Japanese
type vegetation and mild climate conditions on the disputed islands
and contrasts them with the subarctic character of the Kuril islands
north of them.2 2 The Japanese traditionally fished the fertile waters
23
around the southern islands.
For the former Soviet Union and now Russia, the islands are
valuable militarily and economically. The surrounding waters provide ice-free access from the Sea of Okhotsk to the Pacific Ocean and
deep-water harbors.2 4 The islands have been home to a Russian military base, radar station and some 20,000 to 30,000 Russian citizens
25
who make their living primarily from the area's rich seas.
B.

HistoricalSynopsis
1. Pre-World War II Events

It is generally believed that the disputed islands were first known
and explored by the Japanese in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, although this recently has been contradicted by the former
Soviet Union. 2 6 Japan also claims the Ainu, the indigenous popula16 Id. at 340.
17 Id.
18 Id.
'9 Id.

20
21
22
23

See generally Kratochwil, supra note 9, at 65.
BORDER, supra note 1, at 340.
Id.
Id.

Id.
25 A 'Peace Park' Solution to Kuril Controversy, Middle East News Network, Sept. 14,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Yelena Matveyeva, The Kurils Between
Japan and Russia, Moscow News, Jan. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
File.
24

26 JOHN J. STEPHAN, THE KURIL ISLANDS:

203-04 (1974)[hereinafter

STEPHAN].

RUSSO-JAPANESE FRONTIER IN THE PACIFIC

Before the Soviet revolution, Russian authors con-
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tion of the Kuril islands, including the four disputed ones, as a Japanese minority, 2 7 but Russia argues that the "Ainu took Russian
citizenship" some time between 1711 and 1738.28 In the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, Russian Czarist expansion into the Kurils
led to meetings with theJapanese. 2 9 In 1855, the two nations established the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delineation, 30
designating a boundary between them as falling north of the disputed island of Etorofu and south of Uruppu, the next island to the
north in the Kuril chain. 3' The Kuril islands north of Etorofu came
under Russian sovereignty, and the islands stretching south, including Etorofu and the other three disputed islands, fell underJapanese
33
dominion. 3 2 Sakhalin was left for occupation by both nations.
Thus, at this early point, the four islands in dispute were clearly
under"Japanese control.
In 1875, Japan and Russia signed the Treaty for the Exchange of
Sakhalin for the Kuril Islands, 3 4 naming the eighteen islands of the
Kurils north of Uruppu to be ceded to Japan in exchange for transferring all of Sakhalin island to Russia. 35 At this time, Japan remained in control of the disputed islands and gained in addition,
possession of all the islands in the Kuril chain. Thirty years later, the
Treaty of Portsmouth ended the Russo-Japanese War in 190536 and

37
allocated to Japan the southern half of Sakhalin island once more.
Thus, again, no change occurred in the control of the disputed territories: Japan maintained possession of them. Only the status of Sakhalin island was affected.
sidered that Japan owned Kunashiri and Iturup. Also, a book published in June 1945 explained that Japan discovered Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai group, but two years
later the revised version of the same book deleted that explanation. Id. at 204 and 204
n. 12-13. See generally NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE ASSOCIATION, JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES 12-16 (1974) [hereinafter JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES] (discussing the differ-

entJapanese and Russian versions of the early history of the islands); See also infra Part III.
27 JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES, supra note 26, at 14.
28 STEPHAN, supra note 26, at 204 (quoting a Russian source) (footnote omitted). See
infra note 100 and accompanying text.
29 KRATOCHWIL, supra note 9, at 65;JAPAN's NORTHERN TERRITORIES, supra note 26, at
12.
30 Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation, Feb. 7, 1855,Japan-Russia, art.

II, excerpt reprinted in JAPAN'S

NORTHERN TERRITORIES,

supra note 26, at 73 app. [hereinaf-

ter Treaty of 1855].
31 Id.
supra note 9, at 65.
33 Id.
34 Treaty of Exchange of the Island-of Sakhalin for the Group of the Kurile Islands,
32 KRATOCHWIL,

May 7, 1875, Japan-Russia, art. I-1I, excerpt reprinted in JAPAN'S

NORTHERN TERRITORIES,

supra note 26, at 73-74 app. [hereinafter Treaty of 1875].
35 KRATOCHWIL, supra note 9, at 65.
36 Treaty of Peace of Portsmouth, Sept. 5, 1905,Japan-Russia, art. 9, excerpt reprinted
in JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES, supra note 26, at 74 app. [hereinafter Treaty of
Portsmouth].
37 Id.
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2.

World War II and Subsequent Developments

In the early twentieth century, Japan expanded its territory
through military conquest in a fashion that culminated in Japan's entrance into World War II against the Allied powers of the United
States, Britain, and China. 38 Moscow's government, which signed a
Neutrality Pact with Tokyo in 1941,3 9 did not go to war against Japan

until August 9, 1945, five days before Tokyo's unconditional surrender.40 At that time, the Soviet military invaded and occupied Sakhalin and the Kuril islands, including the four disputed islands,
eventually annexing them in September of that year. 4 ' Thus, after
nearly a century under Japanese control, Moscow finally gained possession of the four disputed islands. The former Soviet Union based
its action on the secret Yalta Agreement, 42 made between the Allied
powers and the Soviet Union in February 1945 without Japan's
knowledge, and the Potsdam Declaration, 43 in which Moscow joined
when it declared war on Japan. 44 The Yalta Agreement gave the Soviet Union the Kuril islands, without specifying any of them by name
in exchange for it entering the war against Japan. 4 5 In July of 1945
at Potsdam, the United States and Britain, with the approval of the
Republic of China, called "upon the Japanese to surrender and reaffirm[ed] the stipulations regarding Japanese-held territories contained in the earlier Cairo declaration ....,,46 This latter declaration
had been made by the United States, Britain and China at a conference in Cairo, in November of 1943. 4 7 It stated: "Japan will also be

expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence
48
and greed."
On September 8th, 1951, Japan signed the San Francisco Peace
Treaty renouncing "all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands,
supra note 1, at 342.
39 Treaty of Neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union, April, 13, 1941, Japan38 BORDER,

U.S.S.R., reprinted in JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES, supra note 26, at 74-75 app. [herein-

after Neutrality Pact].
40 BORDER, supra note 1, at 342.
41 STEPHAN, supra note 26, at 198.
42 Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union into the War AgainstJapan: Yalta

Agreement, Feb. I1,1945, US.-UK.-U.S.S.R., excerpt reprinted in STEPHAN,.supra note 26, at
244-45 app. A [hereinafter Yalta Agreement].
43 The Potsdam Declarations: Signed by China, Great Britain, the United States, July
26, 1945, P.R.C.-UK.-US., para. 8, excerpt reprinted in STEPHAN, supra note 26, at 245 app.
A [hereinafter Potsdam Declaration].
44 BORDER, supra note 1, at 343.
45 The Yalta Agreement, para. 3, supra note 42, at 245 app. A.
46 BORDER, supra note i, at 343.
47 Id.
48 The Cairo Declaration, Nov. 27, 1943, US.-UK.-P.R.C., excerpt reprinted in STEPHAN, supra note 26, at 240 app. A [hereinafter Cairo Declaration]. Of course, it is unclear
how the Cairo Declaration can be used to refer to the disputed islands since Japan had title
to them by treaty before the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, the earliest historical event that
Moscow could realistically claim as an act of violence by Tokyo. See infra note 169 and
accompanying text.
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and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over
which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of
Portsmouth of 5 Sept. 1905." 4 9 The term "Kurile Islands" was not
precisely defined, facilitating Tokyo's subsequent argument that the
term did not include the four disputed islands. 50 Following disagreements over certain procedures and terms, the Soviet Union refused to sign the peace treaty. 5 1 The dispute over the islands began
to emerge at this time, and primarily for this reason, Japan and the
Soviet Union were unable to even normalize diplomatic relations and
trade until a 1956 Joint Declaration. 52 This document included a
promise by Moscow to return to Japan Shikotan and the Habomai
Islands once a peace treaty had been signed between the two nations. 53 Tokyo saw this as an acknowledgment by the former Soviet
Union of the existence of the territorial dispute, and it believed it
would be able to negotiate for the other two disputed islands,
54
Kunashiri and Etorofu, once the first two islands were transferred.
However, the Soviet Union reneged on this agreement, citing the
signing of the January 1960 mutual cooperation and security treaty
between the United States and Japan. 5 5 The Soviet Union wanted all
foreign troops to leave Japanese territory before it would keep its
56
promise under the 1956 Joint Declaration.
Since then, Tokyo and Moscow have had many diplomatic discussions concerning the issue of the four disputed islands, but with
little success in devising a resolution. 5 7 In the late 1970s and early
1980s, the Soviet Union refused even to recognize that a territorial
dispute existed. 58 However, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the
rising need for economic and financial aid in the republics of the
former Soviet Union, Moscow has been more willing to discuss the
disputed islands issue with Tokyo. 59 Nevertheless, Yeltsin was
forced to cancel a trip to Japan, scheduled for September 1992, due
49 Treaty of Peace with Japan: the San Francisco Treaty, Sept. 8, 1951, art. II, para. c,
excerpt reprinted in STEPHAN, supra note 26, at 245 app. A [hereinafter San Francisco Peace
Treaty].
50 BORDER, supra note 1, at 346.
51 Id. at 345; see infra Part III.A.
52 BORDER, supra note 1, at 346; see Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration, Oct. 19, 1956,
Japan-U.S.S.R., 263 U.N.T.S. 116. [hereinafter 1956Joint Declaration].
53 1956 Joint Declaration, supra note 52, para. 9, at 116.
54 Mark Medish, Pacific Perspective.- Soviet/Japanese Talks; a Kinder, Gentler North Pacific?;
The Dispute over Ownership of the Kuril Islands Is Complex, but Settling It Could Help Heal a LongFestering Wound Between the Two Nations, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1991, availablein LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File [hereinafter Medish].
55 BORDER, supra note 1, at 349.
56 Id.
57 STEPHAN, supra note 26, at 202.

58 BORDER, supra note 1, at 352.
59 Motohiro Ikeda, Delay of Yeltsin Visit Linked to Turbulence in Russia; Neo-communists

Raise Challenge to President, NIKKEI
brary, Omni File.

WEEKLY,

Sept. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
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to internal pressure from hard-liners in the Russian Security Council.60 These hard-liners have incited resistance to negotiating about
the disputed islands as a political attack on the Russian president. 6 1
Yet, some resolution must be reached soon, if only to relieve the
severe economic conditions under which many people of the republics-particularly the inhabitants of the four disputed Kurile islands-have been reduced to living since the break up of the Soviet
Union.
III. The Japanese and Russian Arguments
A.

The Japanese View

Japan's claim to sovereignty over the four islands is based primarily on the historical argument that these islands are separate
from the rest of the Kurils and are inherently Japanese. 62
Tokyo asserts that the Japanese first discovered and explored
these islands. 63 Japanese merchants and officials, from the Matsumae Clan of Hokkaido Island, visited and traded with the Ainu, the
indigenous population of the Kurils, including the four disputed islands, early in the 1600s, a century before any Russians became
aware of the islands. 6 4 The Ainu later became a Japanese minority.
National maps of Japan depicted all of the Kurils, the Northern Territories, and Sakhalin island in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 6 5 Geographically, these islands have botanical and climatic
conditions similar to the rest of Japan. 66
Tokyo also claims that even after the Russians began to inhabit
the Kurils, the Japanese prevented them from occupying the disputed islands, and the pre-World War IItreaties show that Russian
influence never extended below Urrupu Island, which is north of the
four disputed islands, until the 1945 invasion. 67 Russians began arriving in the Kuril chain early in the eighteenth century, and subsequently, the Japanese officials on the disputed islands of Kunashiri
and Etorofu prevented the Russians from expanding south of
Uruppu island to this disputed territory by expelling the last of the
Russians from Etorofu in 1788.68 In 1798, the Japanese surveyed
Kunashiri and in 1800, they constructed a sign reading "Etorofu, Japan." 69 They initiated a development program in the islands to proId.
Id.
See STEPHAN, supra note 26, at 210; BORDER, supra note 1, at 340.
BORDER, supra note 1, at 340.
64 JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES, supra note 26, at 14-15.
65 Id.
66 BORDER, supra note 1, at 340.
67 Id.
60
61
62
63

68 JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES,
69 Id.at 17-18.

supra note 26, at 17.
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mote fishing and settlement. 70 After a number of clashes with the
Russians and several discussions initiated by the Russians on
designating a border, the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation was finally negotiated in 1855. 7 1 The treaty provided as
follows: (1) The boundary between the two countries was positioned
between the Etorofu and Urrupu islands in the Kuril chain; (2)
Etorofu and the islands south of it, including the rest of the disputed
islands, belonged to the Japanese; (3) Urrupu and the islands north
of it passed to Russian possession; (4) and Sakhalin remained for
72
mixed settlement.
In 1875, Russia and Japan signed a treaty exchanging the Japanese part of Sakhalin island for the Kuril Islands north of Etorofu,
specifying eighteen islands by name. 73 Moreover, "[t]hat the islands
from Etorofu south were not specifically named indicates to Japan
'74
Russia's recognition that they are inherently Japanese territory."
Following the Russo-Japanese War, Russia "agreed to cede to Japan" the southern half of Sakhalin and its adjacent islands in the
Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905. 7 5 According to Tokyo, in 1925 the
Soviet government formally acknowledged that the 1905 Treaty remained valid in the "Convention Embodying Basic Rules of the Relations between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." '7 6
Tokyo next claims that the Soviet Union committed an important breach of faith by declaring war against Japan within the period
governed by the Neutrality Pact. 7 7 Ironically, during this time Japan
was also asking the Soviet Union for diplomatic help in ending the
Pacific war. 78 According to one author, recently revealed information from the Soviet Foreign Ministry shows that Moscow did assure
Japan at least a month before its invasion that the Pact was still
79
valid.
Tokyo argues that the secret Yalta Agreement between the Allied powers and the Soviet Union, which permitted the conveyance
of "the Kurile Islands" to the Soviet Union in return for it entering
the war against Japan, is "irrelevant. " 80 First, Tokyo asserts, it did
70 Id. at 18.

71 Id. at 18-20.
72 Treaty of 1855, art. II,
supra note 30, at 73 app.
73 KRATOCHWIL, supra note 9, at 67.
74 Id. See BORDER, supra note I, at 341.
75 JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES, supra note 26, at 22; BORDER, supra note 1, at 342.
76 JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES, supra note 26, at 22.
77 Tim Johnson, Disputed Territories Shrouded in Muddled History,JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, Apr. 13, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File [hereinafter Johnson].
78 Id.
79 Id. The author states that "recently declassified" materials from the Soviet Foreign
Ministry reveal that the Soviet Union told Japan in June 1945 that the Neutrality Pact
remained in force.
80 Id. The Yalta Agreement stated that the "Kurile Islands shall be handed over to
the Soviet Union." Yalta Agreement, art. 3, supra note 42, at 245 app. A.
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not know of the Yalta Agreement when it signed the surrender. Nor
was the Agreement mentioned in the Potsdam Declaration which Japan accepted at its surrender, and therefore, Yalta is not legally
binding on Japan.8 1 Second, Japan asserts that "Kurile Islands"
does not include the four disputed islands. 8 2 Furthermore, in 1956
the United States interpreted the Yalta Agreement merely as a
"statement of common purposes" which had no ''legal effect in
transferring territories. ' 8 3 Finally, just after the Japanese surrender
and before this Cold War interpretation, the United States had told
the Soviet Union that the sovereignty question
could only be decided
84
at an "international peace conference."
As for the Potsdam Declaration, although the Japanese accepted
it when they surrendered, Tokyo argues that the declaration has no
legal effect because it is not a peace treaty.8 5 Also, the Potsdam Declaration, to which the Soviet Union agreed, incorporated the earlier
86
Cairo Declaration which included a nonaggrandizement provision.
Therefore, Moscow had agreed to the provision disallowing territorial expansion and its actions against Japan were in direct conflict
with this agreement.8 7 Moreover, the Potsdam Declaration simply
declares that Japan's sovereignty "shall be limited to the island of
Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we
determine." 8 8 The language "minor islands" could mean any islands, including the ones at issue, since it does not name them specifically. 89 Finally, although in 1946 the allied commander chose to
defineJapan for administrative reasons as not including the Kurils or
the Habomai and Shikotan Islands, the memo also declared "nothing
in this directive shall be construed as an. indication of Allied policy
relating to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred
to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration." 90
Although Japan gave up title to the Kuril Islands under the San
Francisco Peace Treaty, Tokyo continues to maintain that the four
disputed islands are distinct from the Kurils. 9 ' Furthermore, the SoJohnson, supra note 77; BORDER, supra note 1, at 344.
82 BORDER, supra note 1, at 344.
81

83 Id. See United States Department of State Aide-Memoire on Yalta, Kurils, Sept. 7,
1956, excerpt reprinted in Stephan, supra note 26, at 246, app. A.
84 Johnson, supra note 77.
85 BORDER, supra note 1, at 344 (quoting a document of Japan's Foreign Ministry).
86 Johnson, supra note 77. See Cairo Declaration, supra note 48, at 240 app. A (The
nonaggrandizement provision stated that the Allies "covet no gain for themselves and
have no thought of territorial expansion").
87 BORDER, supra note I, at 344.
88 Potsdam Declaration, para. 8, supra note 43, at 245, app.A.
89 BORDER, supra note i, at 344. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 9, at 67.
90 KRATOCHWIL, supra note 9, at 67; see Memorandum of the General Headquarters on
Government and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan, Jan. 29,
1946, excerpt reprinted in Japan's Northern Territories, supra note 26, at 85 app. [hereinafter Memorandum].
91 BORDER, supra note i, at 346. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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viet Union did not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty and therefore
is precluded from claiming a right under it, especially as it did not
name who the beneficiaries of the islands would be. 92 Tokyo also
points out that Yoshida presented the Japanese view that the disputed islands were inherently part of Japan, had never belonged to
93
another nation, and therefore, could not be repossessed.
Lastly, the Japanese assert that Moscow broke its promise when
it failed to honor the 1956Joint Declaration in which it stated that it
would convey Shikotan and the Hobamais Islands back to Japan
upon conclusion of a peace treaty. 94 At least, Japan points out, the
1956Joint Declaration reveals that both sides recognized the territo95
rial dispute existed, despite what the Soviet Union later claimed.
Although the 1956Joint Declaration only mentioned two of the four
disputed islands, Japan felt that it held the right to negotiate for the
other lands later. 9 6 Finally, since the break-up of the Soviet Union in
1989, Tokyo has also asserted that if Russia is willing to allow the
independence of the Baltic republics and the reunification of East
Germany with West Germany, how can it defend its position on the
97
"inviolability of the post-war borders?"
B.

The Russian View

Although Moscow disputes the Japanese version of the early history of the islands in question, the main focus of its arguments for
sovereignty over the territory is the various agreements made between the Soviet Union and the other Allied powers in the final period of World War 11.98

Russia asserts that it had developed all of the Kuril Islands long
before Japan had even claimed the island of Hokkaido (now the
northernmost of Japan's main islands), an island south of the Kuril
chain and on which the Japanese Matsumae clan lived. 9 9 First, Japanese claims are invalid because between 1711 and 1738 the Kuril
Ainu became Russian citizens, and sovereignty over all the islands
passed to Russia at that time.' 0 0 In the latter part of the eighteenth
century, only a small part of the southern peninsula of Hokkaido was
92 Id.

93 Id. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 9, at 67.
94 KRATOCHWIL, supra note 9, at 68.
95 Id.

See supra note 58 and accompanying text.

96 Medish, supra note 54.
97 Commentary on the Conflicting Legal Claims to the Kuril Islands, Summary of World
Broadcasts, Oct. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File [hereinafter Com-

mentary] (part of commentary by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov in response to a letter to the Russian newspaper, PRAVDA, from the Japanese embassy entitled, Let Us Seek a Solution
Together.)
98 See BORDER, supra note 1, at 340.
99 Id. at 342 (quoting a publication of the Isvestia, "the newspaper of the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet.") Id.
100 STEPHAN, supra note 26, at 204 (quoting a Russian source) (footnote omitted).
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colonized by the Japanese Matsumae principality.' 0 1 Next, in 1798,
Japan tried to incorporate all of Hokkaido into its country but was
unable to govern it,
and a proclamation to that effect in 1834 was
"purely nominal."' 0 2 Moscow also argues that one of the two nineteenth century treaties 0 3 giving Japan control over certain parts of
the Kurils was signed by Russia under duress, 0 4 and that both
agreements were later nullified by Japan's unwarranted attack on
Russia and subsequent unequal Treaty of Portsmouth ending the
Russo-Japanese War in 1904.105 Additionally, Japan's later collaboration with German Nazi aggression against the Soviet Union made
10 6
the 1941 Neutrality Pact void.
As stated earlier, the Russians in their arguments for sovereignty
place the most importance on the several agreements made among
the Allied powers near the end of World War 11.107 First, the Yalta
Agreement is a "legally binding international treaty."10 8 It explicitly
stated that the Soviet Union should receive the Kurils and Sakhalin
island upon Japan's defeat,' 0 9 and it incorporated the Potsdam Declaration, which Japan agreed to when it signed its surrender. " 10 The
Potsdam Declaration established that the Allied powers would determine Japan's post-war territorial boundaries."' Moreover, the Potsdam Declaration derived from the contemporary wartime
agreements, particularly the Yalta Agreement, which carried more
weight than the earlier Cairo Declaration with its nonaggrandizement clause. 1 2 Finally, the language in the Potsdam Declaration
limiting Japanese sovereignty to its four main islands "and such minor islands" as the allies determined clearly was understood by all
parties not to include those islands that Japan designated as its
101 BORDER, supra note I, at 342 (quoting a publication of the Isvestia, "the newspaper
of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.") Id.
102 Id.

103 Treaty of 1855 and Treaty of 1875; see supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
104 "The treaty [of 1855] was signed by the Russian diplomat Putyatin in Japan, then
actually as a hostage, forced by the naval guns of England and France, countries with
whom Russia was then in a state of war [i.e. in the Crimean War of 1853-56] .... Inother
words, the treaty did not establish the legitimacy of the Japanese rights but signified ceding to Japan a territory that had, by that time, been developed by the Russians and was
part of Russia." BORDER, supra note 1, at 342 (quoting publication by Izvestia, "the newspaper of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.")
105 STEPHAN, supra note 26, at 204.
106 Id. Johnson, supra note 77. The Pact was to be automatically renewed every five
years, in this case on April 13, 1946, unless one of the parties renounced it at least one
year prior to that date. Moscow supposedly declared its desire not to continue the Pact on
April 5th, 1945. Russia and Japan dispute whether the agreement was still in effect after
this point. STEPHAN, supra note 26, at 205 n.16.
107 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
108 Johnson, supra note 77.
109 Id. See Yalta Agreement, para. 3, supra note 42, at 245 app. A.
1 10 Johnson, supra note 77; STEPHAN, supra note 26, at 204-05.
111 Johnson, supra note 77. See Potsdam Declaration, supra note 43, at 245 app. A.
112 Johnson, supra note 77.
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"Northern Territories." ' "1 3 The Allied commander's 1946 memorandum excluding the disputed islands from its description of Ja14
pan's territory only confirmed this understanding."
From the Soviet perspective, in 1945 Japan was irrevocably defeated and signed an unconditional surrender. 1 15 Therefore, it
"must yield all land but its native islands to the World War II allies." 16 Moreover, Soviet repossession of the Kuril Islands acted in
the nature of a reprisal against Japanese aggression in the RussoJapanese War in 1904.117 In 1951, Japan formally renounced all title
to the Kuril Islands and the southern end of Sakhalin Island in the
San Francisco Peace Treaty."l 8 During that time, the Japanese Prime
Minister did not distinguish Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands from the
rest of the Kuril chain, although he did argue that Shikotan and the
Habomais were excluded,1 9 and therefore, no real misunderstanding existed as to whether the treaty term, "Kuril Islands," included
the disputed islands.
Finally, as for the 1956 Joint Declaration, the Soviet Union's
promise to return two of the islands, Shikotan and the Habomai
group, was revoked when Japan renewed its security treaty with the
United States during the Cold War in spite of strong Soviet Union
appeals against such aggressive action. 120 Furthermore, the 1956
Joint Declaration was not a "recognition of Japanese historical or
legal rights" to the disputed territories, "but merely a 'gesture of
goodwill' in no way meant to signify a revision of the results of the
113

KRATOCHWIL,

supra note 9, at 68.

114 Id. at 69; BORDER, supra note 1, at 345.

supra note 9, at 68.
116 Id. Of course, Japan argues that the four disputed islands are included among its
"native lands." See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
117 Stalin, in a speech to his people in September 1945, illustrates the resentment felt
by Russian leaders following the Russo-Japanese War:
[W]e have a special account of our own to settle withJapan. In February
1904, while negotiations between Japan and Russia were still in progress,
Japan took advantage of the weakness of the Tsarist government and treacherously, without declaring war, attacked our country and assaulted a Russian
squadron at Port Arthur in order to disable Russian warships and thus to
place her own navy in a position of advantage.. .Russia suffered defeat in the
war with Japan, and Japan took advantage of Tsarist Russian's defeat to wrest
southern Sakhalin from Russia, to strengthen her hold over the Kurile islands, and in this way to close for our country in the east all outlets to the
ocean. But the defeat of 1904 left painful memories in the minds of our
people. Our people trusted, waiting for the day to come when Japan would
be routed and the stain wiped out. For 40 years we, men of the older generation, have waited for this day. And now it has come. Japan has acknowledged
her defeat and signed the act of unconditional surrender. This means that
southern Sakhalin and the Kurile islands will pass to the Soviet Union ....
BORDER, supra note 1, at 344 (quoting Stalin in a radio announcement made to the Soviet
people on September 2, 1945).
118 BORDER, supra note 1,at 345; see San Francisco Peace Treaty, supra note 49, at 245
app. A.
119 STEPHAN, supra note 26, at 200.
115 KRATOCHWIL,

120 BORDER, supra note 1, at 349.
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World War

II." 21

Until the break up of the Soviet Union in 1989, Moscow consistently emphasized the diplomatic principle of the integrity of established post-war boundaries.' 2 2 Several arguments existed for this
concern. First, if the Soviet Union had allowed Japan to repossess
such wartime acquired territory, nearby socialist republics might demand similar considerations. 2 3 Also, Soviet peoples suffered
greatly and sacrificed much during the war, and they would not take
kindly to giving up such hard won territory.' 2 4 Finally, although the
Soviet Revolution in 1989 disrupted post-World War II boundaries,
this does not necessarily weaken Moscow's position on the disputed
islands. 1 25 As one Russian author explains, internal referendums in
the Kurils and the disputed islands such as those that drove independence movements in the former Soviet republics would not likely
favor Tokyo because the islands have been inhabited by Russians
since the former Soviet Union expelled the previous inhabitants at

the end of World War II.126
Analysis

IV.

A.

General Legal Principles

The following discussion applies legal principles of the creation
of territorial sovereignty to the instant territorial dispute to determine who has sovereignty over the four islands. It illustrates the
weakness of an analysis based purely on traditional legal ideas because so many issues are subject to different interpretations. Any
conclusion is subjective and uncertain. This is made all the more
true because under international law, title is relative-the stronger
case wins. 127
Two legal doctrines are often identified at the outset in territorial sovereignty cases: inter-temporal law and critical dates.' 2 8 Inter-temporal law means applying the international law of that time,
not modern law, to the event in question,' 29 and critical dates are
those dates that are significant in evaluating the facts of the particular case. 130 The most commonly cited modes of acquiring territory
121

Johnson, supra note 77.
supra note 26, at 205.

122 STEPHAN,
123 Id.
124 Id.
125

Commentary, supra note 97.

126 Id.
127 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 135 (3d ed. 1979)[hereinafter BROWNLIE].
128 Id. at 131-34.

129 Island of Palmas Arbitration, 22 Am. J. Int'l L. 867, 883 (1928) ( "A juridical fact
must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary to it, and not of the law in force
at the time when a disposition in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.") Id.
130 BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 132-33.

646

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[VOL. 18

are accretion, occupation, cession, conquest, and prescription.' 3 '
Also, treaties and the rules of treaty interpretation are significant in
sovereignty disputes. The following paragraphs analyze the major
historical events of the instant territorial dispute leading up to present times in light of these legal doctrines and methods.
1. Accretion and Occupation
Accretion "describes the geographical process by which new
land is formed and becomes attached to existing land."' 3 2 It is irrelevant to this analysis because this case does not involve any natural
formation of new land. Occupation is a mode of acquiring areas that
no sovereign owns-terra nullius. 133 Historically, discovery of new
territory by itself gave complete title, but by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries effective acts of possession and occupation were
also required to show ownership.' 3 4 "Effective occupation" or control is most commonly defined as "the continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty ....
135 Moreover, "[s]uch control
has to be deliberate sovereign action, but what will amount to effectiveness is relative and will depend upon, for example, the geographical nature of the region, the existence or not of competing claims
136
and other relevant factors, such as international reaction."
In the instant case, presumably either Japan or Russia' 3 7 first
explored the Kuril islands as early as the seventeenth century.
Hence, title to the area demands more than mere discovery, but symbolic acts of effective occupation by the sovereign of the discoverer.
Tokyo may cite such possessive acts as its mapping of the Kuril and
Sakhalin islands in the eighteenth century, their expulsion of the
Russians from Etorofu in 1778, the erection of a sign designating
Etorofu as Japanese territory in 1798, and their development programs promoting fishing and settlement in the area to show effective
control over the disputed islands.1 38 In rebuttal, Moscow may argue
that its development of the islands extended south beyond the
Northern Kurils; that the Japanese never had effective control over
the island closest to them, Hokkaido, much less the disputed islands
131 Id. at 134; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 246 (2d ed. 1986)[hereinafter
SHAW].
132 SHAW, supra note 131, at 246.
133 Id. at 250. The method is usually applied with respect to uninhabited lands, but

may be applied to sparsely inhabited areas whose people lack political and social organization. Id. at 251; BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 142. In the instant case, some Ainu lived on
the disputed islands, but apparently existed without much structure.
134 BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 149; SHAW, supra note 131, at 262.

135 SHAW, supra note 131, at 262 (quoting Island of Palmas Arbitration, 2 R.I.A.A., 829,
839 (1928)).
136 Id. (footnote omitted).
137 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
138 See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
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in the Kuril chain, including Etorofu where Russians had lived; and
that the indigenous population of the islands, the Ainu, took Russian
citizenship in the early eighteenth century putting all of the Kurils
under Russian rule.139
Thus, who had effective occupation and therefore, initial sovereignty over the disputed islands depends on which version of history
one follows. Perhaps recorded history,' 40 combined with Moscow's
mainly negative arguments on the lack of effective Japanese control
as opposed to manifestations of Russian control, favors Japanese title over the islands. Even so, such a conclusion is uncertain at best.
2.

Treaty Law and Cession by Treaty

The Treaties of 1855 and 1875 marked the next significant development in the history of the disputed islands. 1 41 As stated before,
the Treaty of 1855 divided the Kuril islands between Japan and Russia, with a border falling between Etorofu and Uruppu, and designating Sakhalin island for mixed settlement. 14 2 The four disputed
islands fell within Japanese territory. Twenty years later the Treaty
of 1875 exchanged the Japanese portion of Sakhalin Island for the
Northern Kuril Islands, those lying north of the four disputed islands
and each listed by name within the Treaty. 14 3 Thus, not only did the
four disputed islands remain on the Japanese side of the boundary,
but the boundary moved north giving Japan control of all of the
Kuril chain.
When a frontier line is unsettled, a treaty providing a boundary
may create title.14 4 Thus, simple treaty law would indicate thatJapan
acquired clear possession of the disputed islands in 1855. However,
Moscow has argued that the Russian diplomat who signed the Treaty
45
of 1855 was actually a Japanese hostage and signed under duress.1
Therefore, the Treaty did not acknowledge the "legitimacy of Japanese rights," but merely ceded to Japan the islands at issue, which
46
were by then completely Russian.'
International law does provide that coercing a state representative to consent to a treaty will invalidate the treaty.' 4 7 Nevertheless,
Russia apparently made no attempts to break the Treaty of 1855
139 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
144 BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 136-37.
145 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
146 Id.
147 SHAW, supra note 131, at 485 (quoting Article 51 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties).
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once their diplomat was freed,' 48 and that treaty continued in force
until it was superseded by the Treaty of 1875. When a country with
grounds for voiding a treaty expressly or by its conduct apparently
agrees to the validity of the treaty, that nation may no longer raise
that basis for invalidity.' 4 9 Therefore, according to international
legal norms, the two treaties effectively gave Japan sovereignty over
the disputed islands during that period in history.
Japan attacked Russia in 1904, and in 1905 the Treaty of Portsmouth ending the war transferred to Tokyo the southern half of Sakhalin island.' 5 0 This is an example of a cession by treaty, "the
peaceful transfer of territory from one sovereign to another ... [taking] place within the framework of a peace treaty following a war."' 15'
Moscow argues that the war and resulting treaty constituted an illegal act of aggression followed by an involuntary treaty, circumstances which nullified the previous treaties disposing of the islands
between the two countries. However, customary international law at
that time allowed that conquest followed by a "treaty of cession imposed by force" gave valid title over territory.' 52 Hence, at the outset of the twentieth century the previous treaties putting the four
disputed islands in Japanese possession remained in force and continued Japanese sovereignty even after the Russo-Japanese War in
1904.
3. Conquest
Japanese control over the disputed islands finally ended in 1945
with the Russian occupation near the end of World War II and sub53
sequent formal annexation of the area in September of that year.'
These acts were a classic example of acquiring territory by conquest.' 54 However, within modern times war has been defined an
illegal use of force, and moreover, peace "treaties based on coercion
of a state should be regarded as invalid."' 55 Beginning with the
Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919,156 followed by the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 (General Treaty for the Renunciation of
148 See generally, BORDER, supra note 1, at 342 (quoting an official Soviet version of

history
149
Law of
150
151
152
153

in a Russian newspaper).
SHAW, supra note 131, at 483 (quoting Article 45 of the Vienna Convention on the
Treaties).
See supra, notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
SHAW, supra note 131, at 247.
BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 173; Shaw, supra note 131, at 485.
STEPHAN, supra note 26, at 198.

154 SHAW, supra note 131, at 248-49 ("Under the classical rules, formal annexation of
territory following upon an act of conquest would operate to pass title"). Id.
155 Id. at 486. See also Brownlie, supra note 127, at 173.
156 The Covenant required that League "members should submit disputes likely to
lead to a rupture to arbitration or judicial settlement or inquiry by the Council of the
League." SHAW, supra note 131, at 542.

1993]

KURIL ISLANDS DEBATE

649

War), 157 and Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, 5 8 war was
59
generally outlawed under international rules. 1
This principle would suggest that the former Soviet Union's occupation and annexation of all the Kuril Islands in 1945 should be
ineffective to transfer sovereignty of the disputed territory. However, Moscow has asserted that its actions in 1945 were in the nature
of a reprisal for Japanese aggression in the Russo-Japanese War in
1904.160 A state may sometimes justify its use of force against another state as an act of reprisal.' 6 1 "Reprisals are acts which are in
themselves illegal and have been adopted by one state in retaliation
62
for the commission of an earlier illegal act by another state.'
Under modern international law, legal reprisals involving the use of
armed force require not only a prior illegal act, a lack of response to
a request for reparation, and proportionality between the prior illegal act and the reprisal, but also must meet the rules for valid acts of
self-defense. 163 Forceful self-defense may only be justified when "a
necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
64
means, and no moment for deliberation" exists.'
Applying these principles to the former Soviet Union's argument that its 1945 acts were a legal reprisal against Japanese aggression in 1904 shows that it lacks certain requirements necessary for a
legal reprisal. There was no prior illegal act, nor an immediate necessity for the forceful act of reprisal. In 1904, Japan's aggressive
acts of war were not illegal under customary international law.
Moreover, the Russo-Japanese War cannot reasonably serve as justification for Russian acquisition of the disputed islands because Japan
possessed not only the four disputed islands, but also the whole
chain of Kuril islands before the Russo-Japanese War, and that war
and the subsequent peace treaty only involved the transfer of sovereignty over a portion of Sakhalin island and made no changes in the
control of the islands at issue. 165
Nevertheless, whether war is truly illegal under international law
even in modern times is often disputed, and "[t]he international
157 "The parties to this treaty condemned recourse to war and agreed to renounce it
as an instrument of national policy in. their relations with one another." Id. at 543 (citing
art. I) (footnote omitted).
158 This Article states that: "all members [of the United Nations] shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations." Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, reprinted in
SHAW, supra note 131, at 543.
159 Id. at 485-86.

160 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
161 SHAW, supra note 131, at 547-48.

162 Id. at 548.
163 Id.
164 The Caroline Case, 29 BFSP 1137.

165 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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accepted the results of illegal aggression in many
of recognition." 166 Therefore, Moscow's invasion,
annexation of the disputed territory may still have
transfer of title under international law.

Treaty Law and Interpretation: The Agreements Prior to the
End of World War II

Russia also looks to the agreements made among the allies
before World War II ended, the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations and
the Yalta Agreement, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty formally
ending the war, as legitimizing its possession of the disputed
islands. 167
As described earlier, the Cairo Declaration made by the United
States, Britain, and China stated that Japan would be "expelled from
all other territories which she [took] by violence and greed.' 16 8 This
Declaration is a weak basis for arguing Russian sovereignty over the
disputed islands because it is not legally binding for either Tokyo or
Moscow since neither government was a party to it at the time.
Moreover, Japan gained control of the disputed islands by treaties, 169 not by "violence or greed," and therefore the Cairo Declaration would not seem to apply to the four islands at issue. Finally, as
noted earlier, the Declaration included a nonaggrandizement provi170
sion providing that the allies sought no territorial expansion.
Therefore, it is difficult to see how Moscow can use the Declaration
to advance its claim since Moscow, in direct contradiction to the
nonaggrandizement provision, clearly expanded its land territory by
taking possession of the disputed islands and the Kurils at the end of
World War II.
Russia also looks to the Potsdam Declaration for support in its
claim for the disputed islands. This proclamation incorporated the
Cairo Declaration and declared that Japanese sovereignty would be
limited to it four main islands and "such minor islands as we determine." 1 71 Again, this agreement provides weak support for Moscow's assertion of sovereignty. Neither Japan nor the former Soviet
Union signed the Declaration, although Japan presumably accepted
it when Tokyo signed the surrender and Moscow became associated
with it when her government declared war on Japan.' 72 Nevertheless, because the language "minor islands" is ambiguous, Japan will
always be able to argue that it includes the four disputed islands.
166 SHAW, supra note 131, at 248.

167 See supra notes 107-118 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
170 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
171 Potsdam Declaration, para. 8, supra note 43, at 245 app. A.
172 See supra notes 43-44 and 85 and accompanying text.
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The Yalta Agreement provides the strongest ground for Russia's
claim of sovereignty over the disputed islands. It gave the former
Soviet Union "the Kurile Islands" in exchange for Moscow entering
the war against Japan. 173 It is not necessarily legally binding on Japan however, since Tokyo's government was not a party to this
agreement. Moreover, the term "Kurile Islands" is not precisely defined within the document, and therefore it allows Japan to argue, as
she does, 1 74 that the disputed islands are distinct from the Kurile
chain.
Finally, there is the issue of the 1941 Neutrality Pact between
the governments of Tokyo and the former Soviet Union. Moscow
claims Japan voided the agreement by collaborating with German
Nazi aggression against the Soviet Union, 175 but Moscow neglects to
mention Moscow's own alliance with Hitler prior to his decision to
invade Russia. Thus, it is difficult to understand Russia's justification
for breaching the Neutrality Pact since it behaved in a manner similar
to Japan. However, Moscow also asserts that it communicated to Tokyo its desire to terminate the Pact on April 5, 1945.176 The Pact
supposedly provided for renunciation by a party only if done at least
one year prior to time the agreement automatically renewed itself, in
this case April 13, 1946. 7 7 Thus, Russia seems to have an argument
that it did not breach the Neutrality Pact, although Japan disputes

this. 178
5.

Treaty Law and Interpretation: The San Francisco Peace
Treaty

Although the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, and the Yalta
Agreement occurred before the war ended and may not be legally
binding international treaties-especially since Japan did not actually
participate in any one of them-the San Francisco Peace Treaty was a
legitimate peace treaty ending World War II. The Treaty declares
that Japan relinquishes all "right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands."1 79 Even though "modern law ... regards a treaty of cession
imposed by force as a nullity[,] . . . [a]pparent exceptions ... occur
when there is a disposition of territory by the principal powers or
some other international procedure valid as against states generally."' 180 In the instant case, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was
173 See Yalta Agreement, supra note 42, at 244-45 app. A.

174 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
175 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
176 See supra note 106.
177
178
179
180

Id.

Id.
San Francisco Peace Treaty, supra note 49, at 245 app. A.
BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 173 (footnote omitted).
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clearly a disposition by the "principal powers" of the time, the Allies
of World War II.
Thus, under international law, Russia seems to have sovereignty
over the islands of Shikotan, Kunashiri, Etorofu, and the Habomai
group as of 1945. However, Tokyo points out that the former Soviet
Union refused to be a party to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and
therefore should not be able to claim a right under it, particularly
since the treaty does not state who should possess the islands.' 8 '
Nevertheless, the language of the Treaty explicitly declares that Japan gives up all title to the Kuril Islands.' 8 2 Therefore, this last argument does not really aid Japan in its claim to sovereignty over the
disputed areas.
Japan also asserts that the relevant islands are inherently Japanese and not part of the Kuril chain as that term was used in the San
Francisco Peace Treaty.' 8 3 Under international law regarding treaties, interpretation of a treaty involves first looking at the actual text
of the document and the ordinary meaning of its language, and if a
term is ambiguous, then interpretation may involve studying "pre8 4
paratory works of the treaty and circumstances of its conclusion."',
In the instant case, Tokyo interprets the meaning of "Kurile Islands" differently than does Moscow. According to the Russian view,
the clear understanding at the time was that the term included the
disputed islands.' 8 5 Tokyo argues that the two treaties in 1855 and
1875, affecting only the control of the islands north of the northernmost disputed island of Etorofu, show that the "ordinary meaning"
Uruppu
of Kuril Islands at the time only included those islands from
86
north to the Kamchatka peninsula of mainland Russia.
Assuming then, that the term is ambiguous as used in the text of
the San Francisco Peace Treaty, looking at the apparent understanding of other parties as to the meaning of the term in the context of
the preparation and conclusion of the Treaty is somewhat helpful.
At least one source suggests that the United States recognized that
the Kuril chain included Kunashiri and Etorofu and not the Habomai
group when it made the Yalta Agreement.' 8 7 Whether Shikotan was
regarded as part of the same group was uncertain. 1 8 8 The 1946
Memorandum' 8 9 by the Allied supreme commander suggests that
the United States considered Kunashiri and Etorofu as part of the
181 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.

182 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
183 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
184 SHAW, supra note 131, at 480 (quoting Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention).
185 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
186 Johnson, supra note 77; STEPHAN, supra note 26, at 210. See map p 661.
187 Johnson, supra note 77.
188 Johnson, supra note 77.
189 See supra note 90.
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Kurils, but not Shikotan and the Habomais, although the document
excluded all four disputed islands from Japan's territory. 190 However, as noted earlier, Tokyo regards the memorandum as merely
administrative in purpose and points to language in the document
stating that the memorandum made no policy determinations as to
the sovereignty of the "minor islands" referred to in the Potsdam
Declaration. 19 1 Since Japan considers that the disputed islands may
be included among these "minor islands" that make upJapanese territory, it sees the allied commander's directive as having no effect on
92
the territorial issue.'
The United States refused to support eitherJapanese or Russian
claims of sovereignty during the negotiations for the San Francisco
Peace Treaty, although the U.S. foreign envoy to Japan seemed to
suggest that the Kuril "arc" did not include Shikotan or the
Habomais.19 3 Basically, the U.S. position as to the precise meaning
of the term "Kurile Islands" in the Peace Treaty remained ambiguous until Cold War fears in the mid-1950s induced the Americans to
194
support Japanese claims to all four disputed islands.
China supported the former Soviet Union's assertions of sovereignty over the disputed islands during the period surrounding the
treaty's conclusion and in the decade following, but in the early
1960s, China's government apparently found it politically advantageous to reverse tactics and, like the Americans, began advocating
Tokyo's claims.' 9 5 Little-record appears as to the understandings of
Great Britain or other, less central signatories of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty regarding the precise meaning of the term, "Kurile
Islands."
Thus, the ordinary meaning of the term as it was understood at
the time and under the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty
is unclear, but most of the evidence would suggest that the Kuril Islands includes at least two of the four disputed islands, Kunashiri
and Etorofu. Once again, the application of legal rules, in this instance treaty principles, does not necessarily make clear who should
have sovereignty over the islands.
6. Prescription
A final method remains by which Russia may have acquired sovereignty over the territory at issue even if one can argue that Russia
did not gain title through conquest and annexation at the end of
World War II. Prescriptive title requires the long term, peaceful and
190 BORDER,

supra note 1, at 504.

191 Id.
192 Id.
193 STEPHAN,

supra note 26, at 217-218.

194 See id. at 219.

195 Id. at 221-22.
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uninterrupted control of territory that was in the possession of another state. 19 6 Initial acquisition of the area has usually been obtained by methods of uncertain legality, and possession is public and
by sovereign, not individual, acts. 197 Finally, and most significantly,
prescription requires acquiescence by the former sovereign. 198
Thus, sufficient "protests by the dispossessed sovereign may com199
pletely block any prescriptive claim."'
In this case, the legality of Russian control of the islands is arguably unclear, and state possession has been uninterrupted and
public since 1945. However, the question arises as to whether the
Japanese have acquiesced to this control. The degree of protest required to destroy acquiescence, and thus title, is uncertain under in20 0
ternational law, but the use of force should not be essential.
Diplomatic protests are likely sufficient to prevent title from vesting
in the occupying sovereign. 20 1 Japan's first protest to the former Soviet Union's occupation of the disputed islands came in the form of a
petition to General Douglas MacArthur and the Allied Council in
December 1945.202 Since then, Tokyo has protested in many forms
including several presentations to the United Nations.2 0 3 These continuous, official claims are probably sufficient to negate Russian ac20 4
quisition of the disputed territory by prescriptive title.
Prescription as a method of acquiring territory also raises the
issue of an adequate period of possession. 20 5 Although most writers
agree that length of time needed will depend on the facts of the
case,2 0 6 at least one international decision set the period at fifty
years.2 0 7 In the instant case, close to fifty years has passed since the
former Soviet Union's occupation in 1945. It is uncertain as to
whether the prescriptive period would be sufficient under international law. Nonetheless, Russia probably does not have title over the
disputed islands by prescription because the more important requirement of acquiescence was not met.
196 SHAW,
197 SHAW,

supra note 131, at 252-53; BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 159-160.
supra note 131, at 252-53; BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 160-61.

198 Id.
199 SHAW, supra note
200 Id.
201 Id. (quoting the

131, at 253.

Chamizal arbitration, 5 AJIL 782, 806 (1911)); BROWNLIE, supra
note 127, at 160-61 (quoting the Charnizal arbitration, 5 AJIL 782, 806 (1911)).
202 STEPHAN,

supra note 26, at 199.

203 See generally, Stephan, supra note 26, at 199-203 and 207.
204 See BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 161 (arguing that requiring protests be followed

"by steps to use available machinery for the settlement of international disputes, at present primarily constituted by the United Nations and International Court" is often unrea-

sonable and unrealistic). Id. (footnote omitted).
205 SHAW, supra note 131, at 253-54; BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 161-62.
206 SHAW, supra note 131, at 253-54; Brownlie, supra note 127, at 161-62.
207 SHAW, supra note 131, at 254, n.68 (quoting the British Guiana-Venezuela Boundary
case, 89 BFSP 57 (1896)); BROWNLIE, supra note 127, at 161 n.6 (quoting the British GuianaVenezuela Boundary case, 89 BFSP 57 (1896)).
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The last major event in the history of this dispute is the 1956
Joint Declaration in which Moscow promised to return the islands of
Shikotan and the Habomai group to Tokyo once a peace treaty between the two nations had been signed. 20 8 Japan's argument that by
this document the former Soviet Union acknowledged Tokyo's right
to the islands and committed a major breach of faith by reneging on
this promise 20 9 is weak. Both countries were seeking to normalize
diplomatic relations and trade, but the Declaration itself is not a formal peace treaty and, technically speaking, the condition for the return of the islands has not been met. The 1956 Joint Declaration
does show, however, that the former Soviet Union recognized the
existence of a territorial dispute.
7.

Conclusions

Since that time, although officials from both sides have danced
around the territorial issue, the status quo has continued, 21 0 with the
Russians maintaining control of all four islands in dispute. Thus, the
question remains, based on the application of legal principles in the
analysis above, who should have title to the islands, or more precisely, who makes the stronger legal case for title? 2 1' Japan seems to
have a better claim for initial title based on its early exploration and
occupation of the area and the late eighteenth century treaties
designating the border between the two countries as north of
Etorofu. But ultimately, Russia clearly acquired control of the disputed territory through conquest combined with the San Francisco
Peace Treaty and other Allied agreements, and this possession has
continued into present times. Unfortunately for Japan, the international community has basically accepted the situation without much
comment. 21 2 As noted earlier, "[t]he international community has
accepted the results of illegal aggression in many cases by virtue of
recognition. ' 21 3 Moreover, the case is strong that Russia's use of
force was not illegal under international law. 2 14 Therefore, Russia
208 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.

210 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
211 Some Ainu, the original inhabitants of the Kuril Islands, would argue that neither
Japan nor Russia should have title to the disputed islands. While a minority would like for
the area to be made into "an autonomous region for the Ainu," the majority merely would
like for the two countries to "recognize the 'rights' of the Ainu as the indigenous people of
the Sea of Okhotsk region" by giving them special privileges to the area. Tim Johnson,
Ainu Demand 'Rights' in N. Isles Dispute, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, Sept. 3, 1992, available

inLEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
212 Since Yalta, the United States, when reminded of the issue, has basically vacillated
back and forth between initially supporting the former Soviet Union and then backing
Tokyo, depending on Post World War II international policy and Cold War demands. See
generally, STEPHAN, supra note 26, at 214-220. See also supra notes 193-94 and accompanying
text. The rest of the world seems to have remained indifferent to the matter.
213 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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seems to have gained sovereignty over the four islands almost by
default.
In summary, the above analysis based on purely legal principles
is essentially unsatisfactory because the arguments weighing both
ways provide a subjective and uncertain outcome. A successful resolution to this territorial dispute must involve more than strict international legal rules.
V.

The Proposals and a Resolution

A solution to the dispute is needed not only for the advancement of Japanese and Russian bilateral relations, but for the sake of
the inhabitants of the Kuril Islands, including those living on the
four disputed islands. Since the break-up of the former Soviet
Union, this population has been placed in desperate straits, with conditions even worse than on the mainland.2 1 5 A recent Russian visitor
found the islands lacked more than half of the food they needed for
the winter of 1992, and also fuel for heating and running the few
island industries. 2 16 Additionally, the airport on Kunashiri has been
"inoperable" for three years and cannot be repaired, along with
many buildings and homes destroyed by typhoon Rayan in the fall of
1992, because of the lack of building materials. 21 7 Once Russia and
Japan settle the sovereignty question as to the disputed islands, Tokyo will no longer be reluctant to give full scale economic aid to Russia and the other suffering republics of the former Soviet Union.
Therefore, conditions in the disputed islands and the Kurils should
be relieved no matter who gains custody of the disputed territory
because the islands' inhabitants will receive help either indirectly
through economic aid to Russia or directly from the Japanese government. The following paragraphs sketch some recently offered solutions to the territorial dispute, and conclude with a compromise
proposal based on the history of the dispute, legal principals, and
political, economic, and environmental factors.
Some sources would obtain a judicial resolution to the sovereignty question from the International Court ofJustice of the United
Nations. 2 18 However, based on the historical and legal discussion
above, this suggestion is unlikely to be followed because the outcome is unpredictable, and the losing government is unlikely to go
along with the judicial decision. Another group, made up of Rus215 Yelena Matveyeva, The Kurils Between Japan And Russia, Moscow NEws, Jan. 13,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File ("[W]hereas Russia has an economic
crisis, the God- and government-forsaken Kurils have a catastrophe") [hereinafter
Matveyeva].
216

Id.

217 Id.
218 See, e.g., Gregory Clark, Tokyo's Claim to the Kurils is Shaky, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July
18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
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sian, Japanese and American scholars, has proposed the active use of
US. diplomacy. 21 9 They reason that the United States helped create
the problem at Yalta and has influenced it since then, 2 20 and therefore the Americans should help resolve it.221 This proposal seems
rather ambitious, particularly in light of Japan's growing independence from the United States, and because neither the Russian nor
the Japanese government appears to have requested such action.
A number of environmental organizations, concerned about the
islands' valuable and relatively undisturbed ecology, have made interesting proposals. One group, World Waters, based in Maryland,
suggests an "international marine peace park possibly jointly administered by Japan and Russia." 2 22 Similarly, Peace Boat, a Japanese
environmental organization, proposes "plans to set up a kind of 'national trust' to lease" land on the four disputed islands in an effort to
protect them from development. 22 3 These environmentally based
suggestions are innovative, but they are somewhat unrealistic. Moscow desires investment and development in the islands to help the
area's economy.22 4 Tokyo is unlikely to agree to a plan allowing
Russia to lease land on the disputed islands to others, includingJapanese persons, because acceptance would contradict its territorial
2 25
claims.
Other ideas offered to resolve the territorial dispute have an
economic basis. A Korean scholar suggests a temporary leasing arrangement whereby the southern Kurils are rented to Japan for fifty
years, providing Russia with much needed revenue. 2 26 He would
leave a political solution for posterity. 2 27 But this proposal suffers
from the same problem as the environmental group's leasing plan:
for Tokyo, accepting a leasing contract means relinquishing its argument that the disputed islands are inherently Japanese. In another
example, a writer from the former Soviet Union suggests "putting
219 Mr. Yeltsin's Tokyo Trip, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File.
220 Id. During the Cold War years, Washington did not want Russia and Japan becoming too close, and therefore used its influence in Tokyo to maintain the tensions between
Japan and the former Soviet Union. Id.
221 Id.
222 A 'Peace Park' Solution to Kuril Controversy, MIDDLE EAST NEWS NETWORK, Sept. 14,

1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
223 Japanese Peace Group Plans To Lease Disputed Kuril Islands, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Dec. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File [hereinafter Japanese Peace
Group].
224 See Matveyeva, supra note 215.
225 Japanese Peace Group, supra note 223. The leader of the Japanese group states that
they would "abandon" any lease rights if the disputed islands were transferred back to
Japanese possession. Id.
226 "And What About Leasing The Islands?" (Interview With Director Of The South Korean

Institute of Peace Professor Kan Sn Cyn),
Nexis Library, Omni File.
227 Id.

FED. NEWS SERV.,

Oct. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS,
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aside the question of to whom the 'Northern Territories' belong,
[and] creating in them a free economic zone, a sort of Soviet-Japanese joint enterprise which would function in the interests of all
mankind .... *"228 However, the plan seems idealistic in light of historical stubbornness between Moscow and Tokyo on this issue.
The most realistic proposals are grounded in the 1956 Joint
Declaration, and make some modification or variation on the original
1956 agreement between Moscow and Tokyo. One American author
suggests first returning to Japan the two islands mentioned in the
1956 treaty, Shikotan and the Habomais, and then organizing talks
on the disposition of the two larger islands. 2 29 Along with the return
of two of the islands, the two governments might agree "on demilitarization, shared fishing rights and liberal citizenship terms for the
current residents .
"...
230 The other two islands, Kunashiri and
Etorofu, "could become jointly administered United Nations trust
23 1
territories."
Russia also bases proposed solutions on the 1956Joint Declaration. One proposal offers a "two and two" strategy: first, Moscow
would convey the Shikotan and the Habomai islands to Japan as
promised in the 1956 agreement, and next, bilateral exchanges
could begin working toward eventual Russian renunciation of its
23 2
rights to the other two islands at issue upon certain conditions.
Meanwhile, the two countries could engage in "joint use of the
southern Kuril islands while, of course, preserving all the USSR's
sovereign rights." 2 33 Similarly, a journalist from the former Soviet
Union suggests that "[flor the sake of justice and international law,
• . . these two islands should be returned to Japan when a peace
treaty is signed."' 234 Otherwise, perhaps "joint ownership and man23 5
agement of the islands" could be a suitable answer.
A compromise resolution grounded in the 1956 Joint Declaration seems reasonable and realistic, but it should be delayed until
Russia stabilizes its difficult transition to capitalism and hard-liner
resistance in the Russian government subsides. As described above,
there is support from both outsiders and Russians for such an arrangement. Before pressure from hard-liners in the government
228 Commentary, supra note 97.
229 MEDISH,

supra note 54.

230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Bovin On Kuril Islands Controversy, THE BBC; THE SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS,

Apr. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. The author suggests that one
likely condition of transference of the latter two islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu, might be
that "Japan [rid] itself of foreign military bases and armed forces .... Id.
233 Id.
234 Vladimir Solntsev, The Southern Kurils-Are They Ours or Not, SOVIET PRESS DIG., Oct.
17, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
235 Id.
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forced Yeltsin to cancel his visit to Japan in September 1992, there
23 6
were signs that Yeltsin leaned toward just such a compromise.
However, since then, Moscow has proposed a "moratorium" on talks
about the territorial dispute 2 37 and signed a decree creating a special

economic zone that comprises Sakhalin and the Kuril islands, including the four islands in dispute. 238 Japan has, of course, protested the
239
development plan.

At this time, both parties should first agree to work out a formal
peace treaty between the two governments within the next couple of
years. This process might be accompanied by an understanding
based on the 1956 Joint Declaration, that Moscow will transfer possession of Shikotan and the Habomai islands once the peace treaty is
signed. In return, Japan should agree not to press on the remaining
two islands, at least for a reasonable period of time, and begin taking
advantage of the investment opportunities in the islands offered by
the special economic zone created recently by Yeltsin for the region.
This investment must be made in an ecologically sound manner in
order to preserve the area's precious environment. Such action by
Tokyo will not only aid the islands' inhabitants, but create goodwill
and a better image of Japan among the Russian public. Thus, Moscow may eventually become better disposed toward a conveyance of
the last two disputed islands to Japanese possession.
Although the stalemate continues on the territorial issue, some
small signs of progress in bilateral relations have appeared recently,
making the above compromise proposal seem more viable. In January 1993, Tokyo renegotiated business ties with Moscow 2 4 0 and,
without raising the territorial issue, pressed for a visit by Yeltsin to
Japan in the near future. 24 1 Moreover, the Japanese government is
organizing an international council to promote contacts at the regional level between Japanese and far eastern Russian peoples, including those in the Kurils and the disputed islands. 24 2 Japan has
236 Yeltsin Postpones Trip to Japan Amid "Heated Discussions" In Russian Leadership, The
BBC; SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Sept. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File.
237 Russia Proposes "'Moratorium On Discussion Of Kuril Dispute, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,

Oct. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
238 Kurils Economic Zone Established, THE BBC; SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS/THE
MONITORING REPORT, Dec. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
239 Economic Zone in Kuril Isles Raises Doubt of Russia's Intent; Our View: Moscow Appears
Insincere in its Territorial Talks with Tokyo, THE NIKKEI WEEKLY, Dec. 21, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
240 Japan, Russia Agree to Resume Active Economic Relations, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan.
20, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
241 Maxim Yusin, Yeltsin's Visit to Tokyo May Take Place This Summer, SOVIET PRESS DiGEST, Jan. 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
242 Vladimir Kutakhov, Japanese Govt. Sets up Panelfor Contacts with Far East, THE TELEGRAPH AGENCY OF THE SOVIET UNION, TASS, Jan. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-

brary, Omni File.
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previously severely restricted such contacts. 24 s
VI.

Conclusion

The territorial dispute involving the four islands, Shikotan,
Kunashiri, Etorofu, and the Habomai group, old as it may be, continues to hinder bilateral relations between Japan and Russia. Yet, as
the republics of the former Soviet Union make their difficult passage
to independence and a free market system, the need for cooperation
between these two ancient neighbors is greater than ever. The peoples of Russia and the other republics are suffering, but the inhabitants of the four disputed islands and the rest of the islands in the
Kuril chain subsist in even more desperate straits. Clearly, the time
has arrived to resolve this ancient dispute with some kind of compromise. A multistage agreement based on historical promises, as well
as legal, political, economic, and environmental considerations is a
logical and realistic plan.
AMY

243 Id.
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